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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

XIAOTIAN LIU

KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
AND TODD LYONS, ACTING DIRECTOR OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BEFORE THE HONORABLE SAMANTHA D. ELLIOTT

APPEARANCES:

<u>For the Plaintiff</u>: Sang Yeob Kim, Esq.

Gilles R. Bissonnette

American Civil Liberties Union of NH

Ronald L. Abramson, Esq. Shaheen & Gordon, PA

For the Defendants: Raphael Katz, AUSA

U.S. Attorney's Office

<u>Court Reporter</u>: Susan M. Bateman, RPR, CRR

Official Court Reporter

United States District Court

55 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 (603) 225-1453

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Court is in session and has for consideration a motion hearing in Xiaotian Liu versus Kristi Noem, civil case number 25-cv-133-SE.

Can I have counsel identify themselves for the record, beginning with counsel for the plaintiff, please.

MR. KIM: Good morning, your Honor.

Sang Yeob Kim for plaintiff.

MR. ABRAMSON: Good morning.

Ronald Abramson on behalf of the plaintiff.

MR. BISSONNETTE: Good morning, your Honor.

Gilles Bissonnette on behalf of the plaintiff.

MR. KATZ: Raphael Katz for the government.

THE COURT: Good morning everybody.

Okay. Thanks for your patience.

All right. Before we begin, I just want to clarify for the record -- we had some conversations at the status conference on Monday about whether your motion for a temporary restraining order would actually be treated as a motion for a temporary restraining order or whether we would ultimately treat it as a motion for a preliminary injunction but in an expedited manner.

My intention today given the recent developments of late last night and early this morning is to treat it as a motion for a temporary restraining order. I understand that

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there's notice and that typically a TRO doesn't have notice. Obviously, the government is here and the government has had notice of this suit even prior to filing of the suit and that the parties -- I appreciate your cooperation in working together to make sure that the government knows what's going on and the government's efforts to make sure that the plaintiffs are aware of the status of your ability to respond, but given the fact that the government has indicated its inability to provide a true substantive response both legally and factually to the allegations in the complaint and the allegations in the motion until later, either early or late next week, and the inability of the government to commit to either not detaining or not deporting the plaintiff in this case, you know, the plaintiff has asked me to consider this motion today. As a result, I'm going to consider it as a motion for a temporary restraining order. So I just wanted to clarify that for the record. So I'm not transforming this into a motion for a preliminary injunction at this point which means that we're not really going to be considering this on the robust record that we might otherwise consider it when

So if you're looking at other cases in which there's been notice on a request for a temporary restraining order, I don't think this case is really going to be

there's been notice provided.

1 comparable. This is more akin to a traditional temporary restraining order case. 2 3 Does everybody agree with me on that? 4 MR. KIM: Yes, your Honor, for plaintiff. 5 THE COURT: Okay. MR. KATZ: Yes, your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. All right. It's the plaintiff's motion. You can 8 trust I've read everything carefully as much as I could. I 9 10 mean, there were supplements I received this morning, but I am 11 interested in hearing your argument as you see fit. 12 As you know, I have a tendency to interrupt with 13 some questions, but I do want to hear from you. 14 MR. KIM: Yes, your Honor. 15 Sang Yeob Kim for plaintiff. 16 Your Honor, because of the nature of the temporary 17 restraining order I want to start with the irreparable harm, 18 why there is the need for urgency and why the Court should 19 intervene and provide a very short and temporary relief until 20 the plaintiff can go into the preliminary injunction stage. 21 That's really -- the main harm is the possibility 22 of the immigration detention and deportation, and that's the 23 portion of the harm that plaintiff hoped to achieve through 24 the agreement with the defendants. 25 Regrettably, that did not occur last night, and

it's our understanding that defendants cannot promise, cannot assure that no detention or no arrest would happen.

So that's the imminent potential of threat and harm to the plaintiff, and that is related to the merits of the case obviously because the case is very unprecedented in a way that it's unclear whether he is currently out of student status or not.

The government -- you know, it appears that the defendant's notification of the termination through the SEVIS record, which is the student -- the database, indicates that his student status has been terminated and also as well as the revocation of the visa. What that means is the government has the ability and can detain plaintiff at any time and place him in legal proceedings.

And for that -- even though we are not challenging the revocation of his visa itself, instead we are only challenging the termination of his F-1 student status, that portion can serve as a critical and powerful form of defense and relief in legal proceedings.

So that's the main irreparable harm that we think that exists at this moment.

On top of that, because of the termination of his F-1 student status the school is not allowing plaintiff to engage in any research, and that's critical because he -- the plaintiff is a doctorate student, a second year student, and

he needs to engage in research for both financial assistance from the school as well as that's the core component of his doctorate program.

So right now the school at least allows him to enroll in classes and that would allow him to maintain full course of study which goes into whether he's complying with the regulation, but that doesn't really -- I don't want to say it's not meaningful, but that does not meet the progress of his Ph.D. program because he has to engage in the research work and that just cannot happen until this Court intervenes in this case through the temporary restraining order.

THE COURT: Can I ask you --

MR. KIM: Yes.

THE COURT: Is it clear how long he can fail to engage in research? You know, I don't have any other information about his financial wherewithal and I don't have any information about how long he can pause his research and still maintain his progress towards his degree.

MR. KIM: It is unclear at this moment because -so ordinarily the Ph.D. program allows a student to receive
through the teaching assistantship or research assistantship
and then hopes the student finish, for example, within five or
six years because the school is paying for the research and
the student needs to finish it.

Now, because of this termination he cannot --

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    because he cannot engage in any research class at this moment,
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    he will likely have to delay one more semester after his Ph.D.
    program because -- even though we don't know what will happen
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    in this action at this moment, because he's already enrolling
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    for the regular classes, not research class, that will -- I
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    don't know how that will affect -- whether that's -- like, six
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    month of delay or one year of delay, whether that would
    actually affect even the school, to force a school to
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    terminate his Ph.D. program if he cannot finish within four
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            That -- we don't have information yet, but what's
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    clear is that definitely affects progress of his Ph.D.
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    program.
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                THE COURT: And if the Court were to grant the
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    temporary restraining order as requested, will that remedy
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    this situation? I mean, he's already been prevented from
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    participating in research. My understanding is it's only been
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    a few days.
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               MR. KIM: Correct.
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                THE COURT: That's my question is, how long can
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              You know, if I were to grant the temporary
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    restraining order today or tomorrow, is that soon enough to
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    stop that interference? If I were to grant preliminary
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    injunctive relief two weeks from now, is that soon enough to
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    stop that interference?
               MR. KIM: I don't think -- so I don't have a
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definite answer. However, the two weeks would be a little bit late because now he is in the process of changing his course from research credit to the regular lecture classes. THE COURT: Okay. MR. KIM: And what we hope to see is -- even though we don't know Dartmouth College's position about this, what we hope to achieve -- for examine, if the Court grants TRO today or tomorrow, we plan to go back -- we plan to reach out to Dartmouth College so that plaintiff can actually return back to the research, the credit, so that the student plaintiff doesn't need to enroll in regular classes but instead doing the research that he has been doing. THE COURT: Okay. Understood. MR. KIM: So two weeks -- to answer, two weeks of the time might be untimely for the purpose of going back to the research, the credit and course. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. KIM: So based on that, plaintiff believes the irreparable harm prong has been met and satisfied, and I'm going to go into the likelihood of success. THE COURT: Okay. MR. KIM: So we have two claims. One is due process claim on the Constitution. The second claim is APA claim.

So let me start with the due process claim.

core basic principle of due process is notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. None has been provided in this case. The school did not receive any notice twice. The first time the school found out about the plaintiff's status when the school was inspecting the SEVIS record on its own. It's not that the defendants notified the school about the termination of the status. Even when the school found out about the updated status of the SEVIS record, it was not that defendants provided that notice to the school or even to plaintiff. So there was no notice.

And even that explanation showing in the SEVIS record does not provide any sufficient and adequate explanation as to why his student status was terminated. It merely indicates that the initial notation was otherwise failure to maintain status in the middle of the criminal check and/or the visa was revoked, but student has maintained his status and his school has not terminated his status. It's usually the school that officially is the one. DSO is the one who inspects. And if the student does not maintain the status, then DSO is the one who initiates the termination.

THE COURT: Maybe you can explain this to me. So your supplement from this morning -- my understanding is that that supplement clarified that it wasn't an issue about maintaining status. That now there's a clarification that it's either that he came up on a criminal records check or

1 that his visa was revoked. Am I understanding that supplement correctly? 2 MR. KIM: Yes, that's the correct summary of the 3 4 supplement because that's the current updated status record, 5 and it appears that that has been consistent with all other 6 similarly situated students of this updated SEVIS. 7 So putting aside the issue of the failure to maintain status -- so if crime is an issue that forced 8 9 defendants to terminate student status, then they have to have 10 explanation as to what charges, convictions that he has been 11 accused of. 12 THE COURT: Under the Fifth Amendment? 13 MR. KIM: Correct, your Honor. 14 And principally because plaintiff has not committed 15 any crime. Not even parking ticket. He doesn't even drive. 16 He doesn't even have driver license because he doesn't want to 17 get parking ticket. 18 The only thing that he has done was studying really 19 well, and as his master's program GPA shows, he got 4.0 out of 20 4.0. That's the only thing that he has done, studying since 21 2016, to become a computer scientist, to become a scholar in that field. 22

So if the government defendant has a reason to notify him about the criminal basis, then they have to explain more than just merely criminal check.

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And if the government -- I understand that the defendant might not be ready to respond, but if the defendants want to rebut that claim that he actually has been accused of a crime and he has conviction, then defendant should have provided that evidence. But I -- as far as I know, I'm not aware of such rebuttal evidence or --THE COURT: I'm going to stop you right there, and I'm going to give the government an opportunity to respond to that. Is the government prepared right now -- and I'm sorry, the way the courtroom is set up I can't see the government's counsel around you. Is the government prepared to respond to the plaintiff's status, status or SEVIS status today? MR. KATZ: No, your Honor. We have -- I've begun this case yesterday, and since then I've conferred repeatedly with ICE counsel and Office of Immigration Litigation counsel, and we are seeking right now to determine all those facts about the status that has been raised, but we do not have them right now. THE COURT: So can you tell me whether -- at this point can you even tell me whether this is intentional or a mistake? I cannot. I do not know the answer as MR. KATZ: to anything regarding the status at this point. I'm still

1 gathering that information right now. 2 And, again, I've been in talks with ICE, they are 3 working hard on getting that, but it's only been two days and 4 they have not gotten that information yet. 5 THE COURT: Okay. So right now what I have in 6 front of me for the record is I have an affidavit from an 7 attorney authenticating a document, a government document which is a printout from a government maintained website, and 8 I want you to correct me if I'm wrong because I'm trying to 9 10 figure out what I have in front of me. It's a government 11 maintained website, right? 12 MR. KIM: If I may, technically it is the e-mail 13 from Dartmouth College. We copied and pasted it from the 14 SEVIS record. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. KIM: What happened was Dartmouth College found 17 out about that notation in the status and copied and pasted IT 18 into the e-mail and notified the plaintiff. 19 So technically we don't have the screenshot of the 20 SEVIS record itself. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Give me one second. I'm sorry. 22 (Pause) 23 Okay. So I have an e-mail from Dartmouth College 24 and Dartmouth College is representing in the e-mail that this

is a screenshot of what they can access on the government

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1 website. 2 MR. KIM: I apologize, but technically not the screenshot, but they copied and pasted that exact notation as 3 4 quotation -- as a quote from SEVIS record into the e-mail. 5 So they did not -- for example, they did not take a screenshot of the SEVIS record. What they did was this is 6 7 what the SEVIS record shows in terms of what happened to you in terms of the status, and then they quoted, copied and 8 pasted the quotation, the quote from the SEVIS record into the 9 e-mail. 10 11 THE COURT: Okay. But that's the only information 12 thus far that's been available to the plaintiff about his 13 status? 14 MR. KIM: That's correct, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Just for clarification sake, is 16 the plaintiff arguing that if he -- I know this is a 17 hypothetical and I know how much attorneys hate hypotheticals, 18 but is the plaintiff arguing that if he knew he had committed 19 a crime or had been accused of committing a crime, that his 20 due process rights would be violated if his status were 21 revoked without the government stating exactly what crime was 22 committed? MR. KIM: So it depends -- so I have two responses, 23 24 your Honor. 25 Number one response is it's a hypothetical.

depending on the sufficiency of the explanation. So, for example, even if plaintiff admits that he has been accused of the crime, if the government notice merely says you have been accused of the crime, that's not enough. It has to be more than that, a little bit more specific as to which conviction, which crime.

Plus, even if the notice prong of the due process requirement is satisfied, there's a second prong from the -- based on the case that we cited from the First Circuit, the meaningful opportunity to respond, and that's pretty important because there could be some mistakes that are happening. From the government's perspective, maybe through the database search this person was flagged with some sort of accusation of the crime or conviction, but that may not mean that this person actually is the person who committed the crime or convicted of a crime, which is why the meaningful opportunity to respond is a critical point whether that factual allegation is correct or not, and that did not even exist, and that did not even exist for the school.

So here the defendant is provided no notice, provided no meaningful opportunity to respond, and today during this hearing defendants cannot even ascertain and verify whether his status has been terminated or not, but problem is because of the SEVIS record termination notation the school is not allowing -- school cannot because they still

have to comply with -- the regulation is not allowing plaintiff to enroll in research class.

So the harm is real regardless of whether the government actually made a mistake of putting that notation into the SEVIS record or intentionally included that information into the record, but because of that ambiguity because no one can ascertain what actually happened and the real reasons why that notation was included in the SEVIS record, the harm -- the plaintiff is suffering from the termination notation in the SEVIS record.

THE COURT: Do you have any -- I mean, I've obviously looked at your briefing and we've done some of our own research, but we're all on the same tight timeline here.

Do you have any case law that I can review that would give me some guidance of other courts that have applied these same Fifth Amendment due process protections in context either identical or at least similar to this?

MR. KIM: Unfortunately, no, at least based on our -- the short period of exhaustion of the research.

I think that's because this has never really happened. This is unprecedented. And, again, it's usually the school's DSO terminates the status or suggests to terminate the status because, for example, the student was convicted of a crime with a crime of violence or the student is not attending the classes, he's not complying with the

regulation, but here it -- even the school has no idea what is happening, and defendants unilaterally terminate or at least at a minimum included that notation into the SEVIS record forcing the school to pretty much pushing him out of the research, the assignments, and treating him like he is currently out of status.

So because of this unprecedented situation -- and the plaintiff's counsel have been attending and speaking with so many other attorneys just to verify whether this has ever happened, whether there's any example of precedent that actually happened addressed by other courts. We have found none. And I have personally spoke -- we have spoken with at least fifteen attorneys who have been in this field of the F-1 student status, and none of them actually have seen this type of situation.

So unfortunately we are not aware of any on point case law other than the Third Circuit case law <u>Jie Fang</u> which at a minimum provides this Court jurisdiction on their APA claim because the defendant's decision to terminate F-1 student status is a final action and that constitutes -- that provides this Court restriction under APA to review whether that termination was unlawful or lawful.

THE COURT: Okay. We'll get to that one in a second.

Okay. Is there anything else that you want to say?

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I'll give you an opportunity to come back to this. I want to exhaust -- anything you want to say today and anything you want to put on the record, you'll have an opportunity to do that. I want to see if the government has anything else you want to add at this point on this Fifth Amendment due process argument. MR. KATZ: I have -- well, I want to start with responses as to the reason we're here on detention, but if you wanted to talk specifically about the due process piece, I do have something to say regarding to the extent we're talking about the visa, you know, removal of the visa. THE COURT: If you -- I mean, it's okay with me. You can go ahead and talk about -- we did start with the plaintiff's argument about the risk of detention. So if you would like to go ahead and talk about the risk of detention first, that's okay with me. We can jump around. I can follow. MR. KATZ: Thank you, your Honor. So as you know, plaintiff started by explaining why we're here largely is because of the risk of detention and removal and that it couldn't get assurances from the government as to that, and unfortunately the government can't make any representations on ICE enforcement priorities.

But because the main concern here is detention, I

want to start with that. You know, I want to talk a little bit about the detention and removal process, and, you know, the bottom line is that it's not something plaintiff can ask the Court to do, to enjoin ICE from implanting its enforcement authority, and just to talk a little bit about that.

So if ICE would determine that plaintiff was subject to removal, he would be provided with due process in the form of a notice and opportunity to respond. He gets what's called a notice to appear which is --

THE COURT: I'm going to be very rude and interrupt you for a second.

I will let you put anything you want on the record, but I just want to clarify that the only request -- let's focus this very specifically on the request that's in front of the Court today because the preliminary injunction request here is a request that the Court enjoin the government from terminating the plaintiff's F-1 student status under SEVIS and require the Court to set aside the termination determination.

There's actually not a request for the Court to enjoin ICE from detaining or deporting the plaintiff in this case. So you can absolutely say whatever you need to say, but I don't think that that issue that you're trying to brief up orally at this moment is actually in front of me.

MR. KATZ: No, and it shouldn't be. I understand that, your Honor. I think that the reason it is in front of

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    you in a way is that the reason we're here today versus -- you
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    know, next week the Office of Immigration Litigation will be
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    coming to the case prepared to argue this whole thing. We're
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    looking to get the full facts that -- we've talked about his
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    status to do that, but the reason I understand that we're here
    today is largely the emergency is this fear of detention.
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    I thought --
               THE COURT: But there's no question that there is a
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    risk of detention in this case, right? I mean, everybody
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    agrees there is a possibility that the plaintiff will be
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    picked up?
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               MR. KATZ: Yeah. I mean, I can talk to that, but
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    yes.
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               THE COURT: But the government agrees, right, that
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    the plaintiff might be picked up given the SEVIS status?
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               MR. KATZ: That ICE has the authority to do so,
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    correct.
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               THE COURT: Right. So I don't think that's in
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    dispute here. I mean -- like I said, I'm going to give you an
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    opportunity to say anything you want, but I just want to make
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    sure that we're not walking down a road about the Court's
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    authority to do something that I'm not attempting to do and
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    the plaintiffs aren't asking me to do.
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               MR. KATZ: Right.
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               What I'm saying, your Honor, is if -- the reason --
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one of the main reasons that plaintiffs have given today to have the TRO and get the relief they're seeking is to prevent that detention. That's the way I understood it. That's the major irreparable harm that they've argued.

And my point on detention and removal is that these are all handled different ways through due process. And I thought it made sense to put that on the record and then I can address the other irreparable harms as well, but that would seem the main irreparable harm that was put forward.

THE COURT: It's one of them, but I think -- I just want to make clear that -- you started talking about the Court's authority to enjoin ICE. They're not asking the Court to enjoin ICE. They're talking about -- talking about consequences of something is not the same thing as asking the Court to enjoin that consequence. They're asking the Court to enjoin the government from this SEVIS status. I just want to make sure we're all on the same page.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$ KATZ: And we are, and I understand that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KATZ: I think my point is to the extent there is a focus on irreparable harm, it makes sense to understand that process, how that notice of approval and detention process works so that piece of it is met with due process, and I'll move really quickly through this, but the bottom line is

that, you know, you get a notice to appear and you go before an immigration judge, and only then after getting that upon due process and a removal order can that happen, and then that order is administrative appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals which then is appealable to the First Circuit. So there's a whole grounds for that. And if he's detained, he can file habeas corpus in district court.

And, you know, as you stated, it's not before the Court, the decision is not before the Court, but just for the record, the Court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin the issuance of an NTA to do that, but I understand your Honor's point on that.

So I just want to make clear for the record that there is a way to deal with this process and these fears, and there has not -- you know, we have not been told that there's any evidence that he's been detained or in the process of being detained from plaintiff or anything like that.

And as far as the other piece of irreparable harm, which is his studies -- so my understanding is that he can still -- plaintiff can still go forward with taking classes. If he wanted to, he could take his credits and go to another school outside the country. He could do all of those things and continue it. So I don't see what the irreparable harm is additionally. Particularly if it's only going to be another week or so before that's going to be argued. So to me that's

what's really left is that irreparable harm because, you know, any fear of detention is dealt with through a completely different process which comes with due process.

THE COURT: So your argument is that the fear of detention is dealt with by the fact that he could then appeal that detention.

MR. KATZ: I mean, there is -- right. There's a whole handle to do that. If that's what he's really trying -- I guess the point is if that's his main fear and he is trying to get a TRO -- yes, I understand that it's not directly seeking to stop this, but if that's the main fear that he has as opposed to his studies, which I think is not irreparable harm and could be dealt with in a week, then that is not something that can be enjoined by the Court and is something that is dealt through due process in a different way.

That's the government's position.

THE COURT: I understand.

I'm not sure I'm buying the idea that just because there's additional due process afforded after detention that there's no fear of detention. I mean, there are plenty of TROs issued as a result of fear of arrest, and just because you have a right to a trial after arrest doesn't mean that there's no fear of arrest. And you think of all of the TROs that are issued that enjoin the application of potentially unconstitutional laws, and a lot of that is based on the fear

1 of arrest and detention even though there would be a trial 2 eventually. 3 So I understand what you're saying. I think I 4 understand the government's position on that. 5 Again, I don't think that that's exactly what's 6 before me, but I hear you -- I hear you saying that the 7 immediate need for Court action is dampened by the fact that there would be some due process afforded if he were to be 8 detained. 9 10 Is that essentially -- is that the essence of your 11 argument? 12 MR. KATZ: That's correct. And I haven't heard, 13 you know, anything saying that, hey, I think I'm about to be 14 detained or someone is following me or any sort of argument to 15 that nature yet that he is in imminent danger of that. 16 Again, like I said, I don't have all the facts on 17 his status or anything like that this week, but based on what 18 I've been told from plaintiffs I don't understand that and I 19 understand he has not been yet detained. And if he were to be

detained, your Honor, there is this whole process that gives him all these rights if that were to happen.

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THE COURT: Well, I guess what I'll ask you this I mean, there are other students whose SEVIS status has been altered, right? I mean, this has happened before. mean, I know it's unprecedented in some ways, but there are

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other students whose SEVIS status has been altered in the past few weeks. Have some of those students been detained? knows yet? MR. KIM: If I may, your Honor. So, yes, including some of the high profile cases because their student status had been revoked. I'm sorry. Their visa was revoked and then terminated so they are in detention. Now, I don't have the information whether any student whose status was terminated on or about, like, last Friday has been detained or not. That I don't have the information yet. THE COURT: Okay. MR. KIM: But as far as all students similar whose status has been terminated within this month, last month, yes, there are plenty of examples of students either deported or detained. THE COURT: Okay. I also just want to clarify -we're talking about -- a TRO is always very short. It's a maximum of 14 days. I think in this case we're talking about even shorter because -- the length of the TRO in this case would be determined by the government's ability to respond. You know, originally we were talking about a Monday response from the government. Now I'm hearing that maybe the

government needs a little bit more time.

1 You know, if the government had been prepared to 2 respond today, we maybe wouldn't be talking about a TRO. Maybe we would be talking about a fully briefed up preliminary 3 4 injunction with an opportunity for the government to give me 5 the full factual and legal arguments, but the government is 6 not ready for that and so, you know, I'm put in a little bit 7 of a difficult position here trying to figure out how I'm supposed to -- I'm evaluating this under the standard 8 that's required for a temporary restraining order with only 9 the facts available to me. 10 11 And so, you know, the government is saying the 12 plaintiff hasn't come forward with any real evidence that the 13 plaintiff is likely to be detained, but the change in 14 status -- the government is not contesting that there's been a 15 change in status, correct? 16 MR. KATZ: We're not contesting that, but I don't 17 have the facts to explain why that change of status happened 18 at this point. 19 THE COURT: Right. Okay. 20 Okay. Anything further on just the detention 21 issue? 22 MR. KIM: Yes, your Honor. 23 Hold on. I'm trying to give the --THE COURT: 24 anything further from the government on the detention issue? 25 And then I will give the plaintiff an opportunity.

1 MR. KATZ: No, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. KIM: If I may, your Honor. I think that -- what my brother just explained was 4 5 I think first time that we confirmed his status actually has 6 changed because until now even though there was evidence of 7 the change of his status which forced Dartmouth College to force him out of the research and treated him like out of 8 status, but, again, because we didn't have the screenshot or 9 10 we didn't have any notice from the defendants, we didn't get 11 the official confirmation. But I think with the government's, 12 my brother's representation -- unless there was 13 misunderstanding, I think it's clear that the student status 14 has been altered and changed, and that's -- that creates this fear and imminent threat. 15 16 THE COURT: Let me just make sure we weren't 17 misunderstanding. 18 Attorney Katz, were we understanding correctly that you're confirming that his status has changed? 19 20 MR. KATZ: The information that I have is based on 21 what the plaintiff has said. I don't have any further 22 confirmation from ICE yet. We're working on all of that right 23 now. 24 THE COURT: But do you have confirmation at least 25 that the SEVIS status is as represented in the Dartmouth

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    e-mail?
               MR. KATZ: I just have what the plaintiff gave me.
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    I'm taking from what the plaintiff has said that it's changed,
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    but I am still determining with ICE everything that has
    happened, and I have not confirmed -- I don't understand that
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    I've confirmed anything yet.
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                THE COURT: So in your three days -- not your
    personally, but in your office's three days of conversations
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    with national counsel, you have not been able to confirm
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    whether or not the SEVIS status has actually changed?
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               MR. KATZ: No. I believe it's correct it has
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    changed.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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                           I believe that is correct, your Honor,
               MR. KATZ:
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    but I'm just waiting for a full report on this.
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                I think in my preliminary I can make the assertion
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    that I understand it has changed. I don't know why it has
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    changed. And if I find out later that it was an error for
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    some reason it happened, that's why I am hesitant to say that
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    I know the whole status because of that, but I do believe that
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    I've seen at least preliminary talks that it has changed.
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    But, again, I don't know what that means yet, and I don't
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    know, you know, the full extent yet of that.
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                THE COURT: And let's -- I just want to afford
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    Attorney Katz the opportunity if -- he's been hamstrung a
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little bit by coming into this case just today and trying to understand what the status is of everything. So I don't want to trap him into a representation just because he hasn't been able to get information from his client. That's why I didn't want to let you go too far on that.

MR. KIM: I understand, your Honor. I didn't mean to put Attorney Katz into a difficult position. It's just because that fact, that information is critical for the purpose of TRO, I thought that it was important to emphasize it on the record.

So, again, the reason why detention is a heavy factor in favor of the TRO is there is big difference between student out of status, F-1 status has been terminated properly pursuant to the regulation, and then the defendant, arresting, detaining, placed in proceedings versus the person even with a revocation of visa maintaining F-1 student status and then going, still going after the student who otherwise has the student status. There's a big difference between that because that question can be heavily contested during the detention hearing or otherwise in deportation proceedings.

Now, even though we are not contesting that issue, this Court's ability to intervene in this case and the outcome of the TRO significantly changes the dynamics, which is why the possibility of detention -- and we really hoped that we could achieve this without litigating TRO by getting an

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don't know that at this time.

agreement, just short period of assurance that government would not go after the plaintiff for that period, but even then we could not get that assurance. So, again, in the beginning we hoped that we would give enough time to defendant to brief on that by Friday or Monday and respond, but because of the lack of assurance it forced us to request the Court to have an immediate hearing in this case. So that's the argument, a summary of the argument that we have in terms of the detention. Possibility of detention constitutes the irreparable harm. THE COURT: Understood. I just want to clarify because we've been around and around on this. I'm going to understand for the purposes of this that the government is not contesting that the status has changed in SEVIS at this point. If you want to contest that at some later point, you can, but for the purposes of this hearing the government is not contesting that that status has changed in SEVIS? MR. KATZ: That's correct. For the purposes of this hearing, we're not. If I learn something in the future THE COURT: Exactly. MR. KATZ: -- like I said or if it was changed by an error and it has changed back or something like that, I

1 THE COURT: Understood. Understood. 2 Everybody understands that? 3 MR. KIM: Yes, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Was there anything the 5 government wanted to say about the due process argument, 6 likelihood of success on the merits or the due process 7 argument? MR. KATZ: I think the one thing that I left out, 8 besides going through the detention due process piece, was to 9 10 the extent this is hinged on the revocation of his visa, which 11 I understand was one of the possibilities here or belief 12 that's what it was, this Court lacks jurisdiction to any 13 challenge of the State Department's decision to revoke his 14 visa under 8 USC 1201(i), and that would be part of the 15 removal proceeding. That's where that will be determined. So 16 I think it's just important for the Court. 17 THE COURT: Do you guys have a -- do the attorneys 18 have a response to that particular argument? 19 MR. KIM: Yes, your Honor. 20 Number one, we are not challenging the revocation 21 We are only challenging the termination of F-122 student status. The reason why that's important is the 23 notation says the visa was revoked and then SEVIS record was 24 terminated, but from plaintiff's perspective on the due 25 process principle, the plaintiff needs to know what's the

relation between revocation of the visa and termination of F-1 student status. Because even though they might interplay a little bit, under the regulation it's very specific when an F-1 student is out of status and when defendants can terminate the status.

So even though we are not challenging revocation of visa, that notation of illogical relationship from our perspective between revocation of visa and termination of F-1 student status, and there's no explanation as to why.

THE COURT: So I just want to rephrase this for myself so you can tell me if I got your argument wrong.

So your argument is that there is a due process, a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard, in case the visa wasn't revoked. If it turned out it was revoked, then those protections are over because there's no due process protection. There's no right to a hearing to challenge the revocation itself, but there's a right for notice and an opportunity to be heard about the change in status.

MR. KIM: Correct.

THE COURT: So if a change in status is a result of being identified in a criminal records check rather than a revocation of a visa, then this issue doesn't come up, right? Then the prohibition in 8 U.S.C. 1201 probably doesn't come up.

MR. KIM: Right. But we don't even know that. We

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don't even know whether the F-1 student status was terminated because of the criminal act issue, which doesn't go into the Court's jurisdiction or issue, whether this is related to the visa revocation, which can go to this Court's jurisdiction issue, but we don't even know that. We don't even have the explanation from that notation from the SEVIS record which one is the basis for the termination of --THE COURT: So if your plaintiff got notification that his visa was revoked before the SEVIS change in status, there would be -- would there be no due process right to the SEVIS revocation because he would already know that -- how does this all work together? MR. KIM: There is. There still is because again the State Department has the power to revoke the visa. THE COURT: Okay. MR. KIM: And Department of Homeland Security, the defendants, have the power to terminate the status. So let's assume for the hypothetical scenario that plaintiff didn't receive revocation of the visa. That does not automatically constitute termination of F-1 student status. So still even if he -- assuming that he did receive such notice from the State Department, for example getting a call from the U.S. Embassy in China or the State Department in D.C., he still is entitled to receive the notice with respect

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to the termination of the student status as well as a
meaningful opportunity to be heard because the basis to
terminate revocation of the visa and terminate status, they
are very different.
           Why the State Department --
           THE COURT: I mean, are they different? I mean, if
the visa is terminated, they can terminate status, right?
          MR. KIM: No.
           THE COURT: I mean, they can change the status in
SEVIS.
          MR. KIM: No.
           THE COURT: No, because of this entry and reentry
issue?
          MR. KIM: Correct.
           THE COURT: Okay.
          MR. KIM: So even if the visa was revoked, assuming
that that's actually true, that doesn't mean that his SEVIS
record should have been terminated.
           THE COURT: Right. Unless he leaves the country,
and then --
          MR. KIM: Yes. Correct. If he leaves the country,
he would not be able to come back unless he reapplies for the
visa at the embassy overseas and gets a visa, but that's a
very different scenario because, again, while he's in the
United Stated the mere revocation of visa does not
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automatically terminate his student status. There's no regulation. There's no statute allowing such termination of F-1 student status. THE COURT: Okay. MR. KIM: I don't have further with respect to due process argument, but I can go into the APA claim. THE COURT: Okay. Attorney Katz, do you want to be heard on any of the conversation we just had about the due process rights with respect to SEVIS as differentiated from the due process rights related to the revocation of the visa? MR. KATZ: I mean --THE COURT: And, again, it's okay if you don't. mean, I understand that the government is not prepared to provide substantive responses to these legal and factual arguments. MR. KATZ: Yeah, and I think that's something that the government would want to respond to with the Office of Immigration Litigation that, you know, the nuance that he's talking about there, the differences. I will say the way we initially understood this was that there was an understanding or an assertion by plaintiff that he thought his visa had been revoked and that this was I quess an indirect way to challenge it, and that's why I raised

the jurisdiction issue just for the record in terms of the

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nuance, the differences, and what happens when a visa is revoked versus the SEVIS record status, student status. reserve that for a later day on the substance if it's to be heard on that. THE COURT: Understood. MR. KATZ: And, yeah, that's all I have on that issue. THE COURT: Okay. I just want to check with the court reporter. Do you need a brief break? You're okay? Okay. Do you guys want to move on to the Administrative Procedure Act? MR. KIM: Yes, your Honor. So independent from due process argument, under APA the government cannot act outside of the legal authority. the legal authority comes from statute or regulation. And as the Third Circuit in Jie Fang indicated, the authority of the government to terminate F-1 student status is limited by the regulation, and it's very specific in terms of three categories where the defendants can unilaterally terminate the status. None has happened here. At a minimum, that's the plaintiff's allegation, and of course that's something that if the defendants want to rebut and respond, they can do that, but at least for now none of those criteria has happened or

otherwise he has maintained his status.

Again, the updated SEVIS record indicates -deleted that otherwise failure to maintain student status,
deletes that portion. So I'm assuming that defendants are not
alleging that plaintiff has failed to maintain his status.

Then if that's not the case and if, for example, then -- unless it's a criminal issue, unless it is consistent with a regulation, we just do not know under which legal authority that defendant actually could unilaterally terminate his F-1 student status.

And that's the information as of now, and our allegation is that defendants have no legal authority either by the statute or regulation to terminate plaintiff's F-1 student status, and, therefore, under APA that's unlawful and that decision to terminate should be set aside.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I don't have a response at this time. Also, considering it's intertwined with some facts that I would need and that I assume the Office of Immigration Litigation will need when they respond.

THE COURT: Okay.

So just for clarification, the only facts I have in front of me are the verified facts of the plaintiff that none of the developments necessary to justify the right to terminate under the APA have occurred in this case. I mean,

1 that's the state of the record right now. MR. KATZ: Yeah. I mean, I understand. I don't 2 have an answer to that at this time. 3 4 THE COURT: Okay. All right. We have talked about possibility of 5 irreparable harm. We talked about likelihood of success on 6 7 the merits. Obviously, I'm wrapping irreparable harm under the four-factor test in with the need for the TRO unless you 8 want to be heard separately. 9 10 MR. KIM: No, your Honor. Yes, it's all 11 interrelated. There's a third prong and a fourth prong, the 12 public interest. 13 THE COURT: We're going to get to those. I do want 14 to cover the balance of the relevant hardships because I've 15 heard from you, and I understand that the government -- you 16 know, I'm trying to give you an opportunity but not force you 17 to respond if you're not ready, but I want to make sure we 18 give the government an opportunity to respond to the portions 19 that they're ready to respond to. 20 So I do have your arguments on these. I want to 21 hear from you if you want to make those arguments, but why

So I do have your arguments on these. I want to hear from you if you want to make those arguments, but why don't we flip this and I'll just start with the government and let the government tell me if they have anything they want to say on these.

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Do you have anything that you want to add on the

balance of the relevant hardships?

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I don't think too much different than our argument on the irreparable harm, which is that with detention worries there haven't really been anything asserted as to events about to happen or not, and, two, that that's held by a separate due process.

And as far as the irreparable harm as to his student status, I don't know that another week would make a difference. And also given the fact that he still can take classes, he still can get his credit, and he can continue his Ph.D., it's not that he's left without a way to finish his Ph.D. program particularly in, you know, in just the immediate future.

So I think if you look at the balance of the hardships from exploring this even another week or two, I don't see that the balance tips in the favor to grant the TRO here given the lack of hardship that's been asserted.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I guess I'll put it another way. It's a balance. So what is the government's hardship? What we're talking about here is a TRO that's between now -- the TRO requested is between now and when the government is prepared to respond to the allegations in both the request for preliminary relief -- and my understanding, by the way, in the more recent filing is that there might be a more robust preliminary injunction motion. I wasn't sure --

we'll get to that at the end of this hearing. But when the government is ready to respond between now and then, so some period 14 days or less, to a requested TRO that would enjoin the government from terminating the F-1 student status under the SEVIS system and require the government to set aside their termination determination in SEVIS. So what's the hardship that would be suffered by the government if I were to issue that TRO?

MR. KATZ: Again, your Honor, without any more facts, I don't know that I can fully answer that other than to kind of go back to just the point as to the extent this is indirectly trying to enjoin detention. Again, not that I have the facts on that. That -- you know, that's not something that's appropriate that I can do.

But as far as your question about SEVIS itself, I don't have an answer apart from, you know, the irreparable harm piece of this and the fact that I don't see the balance of hardships -- you know, how the balance equity tips the other way really and what the hardship is for another week of not having a TRO hearing.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, he's not getting paid. He's not moving towards his Ph.D. He might be forced to -- he's going to be forced to register for classes that don't have this research component that might preclude him from continuing even if I were to ultimately grant the relief.

This is not my argument, obviously. I'm reiterating the argument received from the plaintiffs that even if I were to ultimately grant the relief requested at the later hearing, it may be too late to rejoin those research classes which would extend the Ph.D. program an entire semester which is both time-consuming and expensive. So, I mean, I think that's the hardship that's been put in front of me that has nothing to do with a risk of detention or deportation.

So I do have something in a basket for the plaintiff, and that's why I was asking, you know, what is in the basket for the government.

It's okay. You know, I understand, I think, what your argument is on behalf of the government, which is really that perhaps this is an end run to interfere with the government's ability to detain or deport, but I think given how closely cabined the request is for the temporary restraining order in this case -- you know, I'm not being asked to interfere with the government's ability to detain or deport. I'm being asked this very narrow thing which really is related to his ability to participate in his educational endeavors.

MR. KATZ: I understand, your Honor, and I don't have really anything to add on what I know now as to what the specific harm to the government is on the SEVIS apart from how you articulated it before.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything the plaintiff wants to add to that particular prong?

MR. KIM: Briefly, your Honor, if I may.

So because of the defendant's university letter of termination of F-1 student status the plaintiff is the one who is suffering, like, every minute, every second, and we don't have much time whether he can even go back to the research credit because the most recent evidence we submitted was the school -- because school had concern with compliance with its own regulation, school is forcing plaintiff to enroll in non-research classes which would not be meaningful for his Ph.D. program.

So by the time of two weeks even if this Court grants, for example, preliminary injunction, even assuming that happens, there is a very good chance that he would not be able to go back to the research credit because of how the school registration system functions.

And he's not getting any money. He is sitting in fear in his residence not being able to do anything. The only thing that he has done at least based on our allegation is studying hard. That is it.

He has been in the United States since 2016. The only thing that he has done, not even driving, not even doing a lot of social, but he wanted to be a scholar in computer science and he knew that the United States was the most

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competitive in the country in terms of computer science in the So that's the only thing he has done is study very hard, and now because of university letter of termination, he's the one who is suffering. So we hope that the Court issues TRO, and I understand it's not going to be very long because we will quickly move into filing the preliminary injunction memorandum so that we can litigate the legal issues and the others through the PI proceedings, but we hope the Court issues the TRO as soon as possible. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. KIM: Thank you. THE COURT: There is one final prong. It was a precise closing, but there is one more prong, which is the affect of the Court's rule on the public interest. We'll start again with the government. If you would like to add anything on the public interest here, Attorney Katz, I'm going give you an opportunity to do that. MR. KATZ: I don't think it's much more than I've already stated, but, again, in terms of ICE being able to implant its enforcement authority, that is in the public interest. And to the extent that this is an attempt to implant that somehow, that is in the public authority and otherwise ICE or the State Department to carry out the various

tasks that need to be carried out. So that's obviously -- I

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    think that's already been stated in some way for the record,
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    but that is in the public interest.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, I can assure you I have
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    that in mind. I've been trying to express that I have that in
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    mind throughout.
               MR. KATZ: And you have, your Honor, and,
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    therefore, I don't want to dwell there too much other than to
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    make that point for the record.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that.
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               MR. KIM: If I may briefly, your Honor.
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               So the public interest lies with what Congress has
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    intended really. Because Congress intended to allow
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    non-citizen students to come into the country as long as they
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    comply with the regulations and they study as they intended,
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    and that's precisely what plaintiff has done.
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    defendant university letter of termination of his F-1 student
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    status is forcing the school and forcing him to be not doing
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    the things that he should have done consistent with what
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    Congress intended. So the public interest prong should be
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    heavily in favor of plaintiff.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
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               Does the government take a position on whether a
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    bond should be required in this case if the Court were
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    inclined to grant a temporary restraining order?
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               MR. KATZ: Yes, your Honor.
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                The government does request an order in accordance
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    with Rule 65.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Does the government have an
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    amount of a bond that it would request?
               MR. KATZ: Your Honor, we're unaware again of what
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    the actual costs that will be incurred are yet. So we just
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    ask that a reasonable bond be given.
                THE COURT: It's very typical in these types of
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    cases. You're just requesting one and no specific amount?
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               MR. KATZ: That's correct, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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                Plaintiffs, do you want to be heard on the issue of
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    bond?
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               MR. KIM: We ask the Court to waive the bond in a
    case like this.
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                THE COURT: Okay. I'm probably going to take a
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    brief recess of about five minutes.
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                Is there anything else that either party would like
    to say before I do that?
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               MR. KIM: No, your Honor.
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               MR. KATZ: No, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Okay. I can't promise you that I'm
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    going to give you a ruling when I come back out here.
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                Okay. A brief recess.
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                (RECESS)
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THE COURT: Okay. Now that you've had the benefit of a few minutes, I know when I was in your position sometimes I thought of a few things I wish I had said, does anybody else want to add anything to the record? It's okay if you don't. Sometimes it's better not to. MR. KIM: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Anything from the government? MR. KATZ: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Well, ably argued. I'm going to tell you what I'm going to do. not going to issue my official ruling from the bench right now, but I'm going to tell you that I'm going to grant the temporary restraining order. You'll get a brief order that follows mostly the proposed order that you filed. The relief requested will be identical to the relief that you requested in your proposed order, but the reasoning might just be a little bit different because I had to combine some of the supplements that you filed. I'll try to get that out guickly. I have a 2 o'clock so it might be after that, but I'll try to get it out sometime today. Is there any follow-up now? I don't know if you guys are going to communicate and let me know when we're going to schedule the next hearing in this case.

MR. KIM: Yes, your Honor. The plaintiff plans to

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discuss the preliminary injunction, the scheduling, so that
the Court does not need to set the schedule so that the
parties can propose the scheduling.
           THE COURT: Okay. I have some potentially
inconvenient news for you, but we only have 14 days so that
gets us to the 23rd, which is fine, but I am out and
unavailable the final week in April, which probably doesn't
come as a surprise to many of you, so it needs to be before
then with time for me probably to issue an order.
           So to the extent that the government wants the full
14 days, let's try to give it less than the full 14 days so
that I can have an opportunity to issue a robust order and
really give this the time and thought that's necessary for
such serious issues.
          MR. KIM: Yes, your Honor. Plaintiff will confer
with the defendant's counsel.
           THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
           Oh, and I was willing on such short notice this
morning to accommodate counsel from I believe it was
Washington D.C. via Zoom, but typically I require parties to
be present in court for oral argument. So we should plan on
people being here in person if they're planning on
participating in the hearing.
          MR. KATZ: Understood, your Honor.
           THE COURT: Okay. If there are extenuating
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circumstances, obviously, please bring them to my attention.
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    I do try to be -- you know, I try to be accommodating to the
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    extent that I can, but I do find it's a better conversation
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    and more meaningful if we can have everybody in the same room.
               MR. KATZ: Understood, your Honor. That request
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    was just in the hope of having all the lawyers here today.
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                THE COURT: Yeah, which is why I granted it. Yes.
    Absolutely.
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               MR. KATZ: If it's next week, with the
    understanding that they would have to be here in person.
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                THE COURT: Okay. All right.
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               Nothing further?
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                Okay. Court's adjourned.
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                (Conclusion of hearing at 12:30 p.m.
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C E R T I F I C A T EI, Susan M. Bateman, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate transcription of the within proceedings to the best of my knowledge, skill, ability and belief. Submitted: 4-23-25 /s/ Susan M. Bateman SUSAN M. BATEMAN, RPR, CRR